A highway problem is a cost sharing problem that arises if the common resource is an ordered set of sections with fixed costs such that each agent demands consecutive sections. We show that the core, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value on the class of TU games associated with highway problems possess characterizations related to traditional axiomatizations of the solutions on certain classes of games. However, in the formulation of the employed simple and intuitive properties the associated games do not occur. The main axioms for the core and the nucleolus are consistency properties based on the reduced highway problem that arises from the original highway problem by eliminating any agent of a specific type and using her charge to maintain a certain part of her sections. The Shapley value is characterized with the help of individual independence of outside changes, a property that requires the fee of an agent only depending on the highway problem when truncated to the sections she demands. An alternative characterization is based on the new contraction property. Finally it is shown that the games that are associated with generalized highway problems in which agents may demand non-connected parts are the positive cost games, i.e., nonnegative linear combinations of dual unanimity games.
Introduction
In this paper we analyze a particular kind of cost allocation problem in which some agents jointly produce and finance a common resource or facility. The peculiarity is that this resource can be separated into a number of ordered sections. Moreover, each agent requires some consecutive sections, and each section has a fixed cost. The issue of our present study is how to share the total cost of all sections among the users in an efficient and fair way. A simple example that illustrates this situation is a linear highway, where the sections are delimited by the entry and exit points, and each car only needs the highway sections between its entry and exit point. 1 This example motivates why these problems are called highway problems (Kuipers, Mosquera, and Zarzuelo 2013) . The well-known airport problems can be seen as special highway problems, in which all agents' entries coincide.
Cooperative game theory has proved to be very useful to solve cost allocation problems, since transferable utility (TU) games are highly appropriate to model these kinds of situations. Moreover, the solution concepts of these games embody a criterion of fairness in their definition and satisfy certain properties or axioms which make them particularly suitable for these problems. With every highway problem a cooperative TU game is associated by assigning to every coalition the cost of the highway sections that accommodates all the members in that coalition. Such a cooperative game is called a highway game. Subsequently some cooperative solution concepts are applied to the highway game to solve the original problem. In this paper we will focus on three solution concepts on the class of highway problems: the core, the (pre)nucleolus and the Shapley value. We axiomatize these three solutions for the class of highway problems.
The axiomatizations of the core and the (pre)nucleolus of highway problems are based on the consistency principle. According to this principle, if a group of agents pays its share and leaves the others in a renegotiation, then the shares of the remaining agents do not change in the subsequent reduced situation. The consistency property has proved to be very powerful in characterizing some of the most important solutions concepts in cooperative game theory: the prenucleolus (Sobolev 1975) ; the core (Peleg 1985 , Peleg 1986 , Tadenuma 1992 , Hwang and Sudhölter 2001 ; the Nash bargaining solution (?); the Shapley value of TU games and the egalitarian NTU value (Hart and Mas-Colell 1989) ; the Harsanyi NTU value (?). Consistency has also played a prominent role in other contexts: for instance, in bankruptcy problems (Aumann 1985) , airport problems (Potters and Sudhölter 1999) , and other allocation problems. The aforementioned articles employ different definitions of consistency because of the context's diversity. In general, the crucial issue is to identify the available alternatives for intermediate coalitions in a reduced situation. As a consequence there is not a canonical way of modeling the reduced problem, and many different kinds of reduced problems have been proposed in the literature. In the case of a highway problem, we require the consistency property only for an agent i, whose needs are minimal in the sense that they do not cover those of any other agent (up to an exception the explanation of which is postponed to Section 3). We assume that i's intention is to pay only for the part he uses, so it seems natural that her payment before leaving should be subtracted from the cost of her sections. So every agent sharing some of the segments used by i might benefit from this reduction, but it cannot harm her.
On the other hand one major axiomatization of the Shapley value of a highway problem is based on a monotonicity principle. This principle has already been used in the context of cooperative games (Young 1985) and in cost allocation problems as well (?). In the case of highway problems this principle states that the share payed by agent i may only depend on the highway problem when restricted to the sections of the highway used by that agent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce two representations of highway problems and their corresponding highway games. Section 3 is devoted to the axioms employed in the subsequent characterizations of the core and the (pre)nucleolus. The game associated with the reduced highway problem coincides with the Davis-Maschler reduced game of the original highway game. However, neither the definition of the reduced highway problem nor of the corresponding reduced highway problem property (RHP) and its converse (CRHP) refer to the associated highway games. In Section 4, resembling a result of Peleg (1986) , we show that the core is the unique solution for highway problems that satisfies individual rationality, unanimity for 2-person highway problems (UTPH), RHP, and CRHP. Moreover, if a stronger version of CRHP is employed, then UTPH may be replaced by non-emptiness. In Section 5 we prove that the (pre)nucleolus is characterized by single-valuedness, the equal treatment property, covariance under exclusive prolongations, and RHP. In Section 6 we characterize the Shapley value (a) with the help of individual independence of outside changes, which is a suitable translation of Young's (1985) strong monotonicity, and, alternatively, (b) with the help of the contraction property which is some kind of consistency property and entirely new. Indeed, the game associated with a contracted highway problem, the definition of which requires to compute the solution of a certain truncated highway problem, is not the Hart-Mas-Colell (1989) "reduced" game of the original highway problem. In Section 7 we show that a generalized highway game in which the sections used by an agent may not be connected is a positive cost game, i.e., a nonnegative linear combination of dual unanimity games, and vice versa. Finally, Section 8 closes the paper with some discussions.
Preliminaries
Let U be a set (|U | 5 is needed in Example 8.1, and we always assume that {1, . . . , } ⊆ U if |U | ), called the universe of agents. A finite nonempty subset of U is called a coalition.
Definition 2.1 A highway problem is a pair (N, I) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) N is a coalition.
(2) I is a mapping that assigns to each i ∈ N a compact nonempty interval
Denote by H the set of highway problems. For the generic element (N, I) ∈ H, we typically write
The elements in N represent the agents involved in the problem. For each i ∈ N , the interval I i associated with agent i is an interval representing the (connected) parts of the common facility that is used by agent i. This common facility is symbolized by I N . Condition (3) says that the first part starts at 0, the last one finishes at certain real number b, and there are no gaps between the parts used by N . The length of an interval represents its cost. Thus the cost of serving agent i is b i − a i , and accordingly the total cost of the common facility is b that is the amount to be shared between all the agents.
In order to define the sections of the highway problem (N, I) let (β 0 , . . . , β m ) be a real sequence of minimal length that satisfies the following properties:
• For each i ∈ N there exist r, r , 0 r < r m, such that
Note that m and (β 0 , . . . , β m ) are uniquely determined by the foregoing properties and minimality. Then
is the set of sections of (N, I). Note also that, if β r = β r+1 (i.e., if the r + 1-th section is a singleton), then there exists i ∈ N with I i = [β r , β r+1 ], and if r + 1 < m in addition, then β r+2 > β r+1 . Finally note that M I is totally ordered by [0,
, where ≺=≺ I is the strict total order relation.
The (cost) TU game associated with the highway problem (N, I) is the game (N, c I ) defined by
where λ * denotes the Lebesgue measure on R. A TU game is a highway game if it the TU game associated with a highway problem. Note that highway games are concave. 2
That is, the real number c I (S) is the cost of serving the agents in S.
Remark 2.2 Kuipers, Mosquera, and Zarzuelo (2013) define a "highway problem" to be a quadruple (N, M, C, T ) that satisfies the following properties: N is a coalition, M is a finite nonempty set strictly ordered by ≺ (the set of sections), C : M → R + is a mapping that represents the cost of each section, and T : N → 2 M \ {∅} is a mapping, where T (i) represents the set of sections used by agent i, satisfying
Though (2.5) -(2.7) do formally not appear in the aforementioned paper, these conditions may be added without loss of generality.
The coalition function c M,C,T of the corresponding "highway problem" (N, c) is defined for each
where T (S) = i∈S T (i).
Although "highway problems" are formally different from those in Definition 2.1, they are conceptually equivalent. Indeed, if (N, M, C, T ) is a "highway problem", then it can be associated with an element of H as follows. Define α k = k j=1 C(j) for k = 0, . . . , m, and 
Axioms
We now introduce the axioms employed in the subsequent characterizations and their proofs of the core and the (pre)nucleolus. Denote the set of feasible cost allocations and the set of efficient feasible cost allocations (preimputations) by X * (N, I) and X(N, I) respectively, i.e.,
where x(S) = i∈S x i for all S ⊆ N and x ∈ R N .
Moreover, let 1 S ∈ R N denote the indicator vector of S, i.e., 1 S
A solution σ assigns to each highway problem (N, I) a subset of X * (N, I). Its restriction to a set H ⊆ H is again denoted by σ. A solution on H is the restriction to H of a solution. A solution σ on H satisfies (4) the equal treatment property (ETP) if for all (N, I) ∈ H , all i, j ∈ N , and all x ∈ σ(N, I):
(5) individual rationality (IR) if for all (N, I) ∈ H , all i ∈ N , and all x ∈ σ(N, I):
(6) reasonableness from below (REASB) if for all (N, I) ∈ H , all x ∈ σ(N, I), and all i ∈ N :
NEM, PO, SIVA, ETP, and IR are standard in the literature and do not need further explanation. It should be remarked that by the concavity of highway games, IR is equivalent to reasonableness from above in the sense that each agent has to pay at most his maximal marginal contribution to the cost of the entire highway. Hence, IR and REASB together may be called reasonableness.
The interpretation of PCOV is simple: If an agent asks for prolonging the highway just for herself, then the cost for this modification is added to her payment, whereas the payments of the other agents is not changed.
Remark 3.1 Recall that a solution σ on a set Γ of TU cost games assigns a subset σ(N, c) of
, and COV (σ(N, αc + β) = ασ(N, c) + β for α > 0, β ∈ R N whenever (N, c), (N, αc + β) ∈ Γ) on the set Γ of all games associated with elements of H imply (1) -(8) for the corresponding solution on H that is, by a slight abuse of notation, again denoted by σ (i.e., σ(N, I) = σ(N, c I ) for all (N, I) ∈ H). Here, COV implies PCOV as well as scale covariance, a property that, though satisfied by all our solutions, is not needed in our characterization results.
We now define reduced highway problems. Let (N, I) ∈ H, i ∈ N , and k ∈ N ∪ {0}. Let i ∈ N be feasible and x ∈ R N . The reduced problem (N \ {i}, I −i,x ) is defined as follows, where
If i is of type 0, then
The definition of a j and b j in the case that i is an oriented agent of type 1 may differ from (3.1) and (3.2) only inasmuch as
i is a left agent, and (3.3)
i.e., if i is both a left and a right agent, then we regard her as a left agent.
Note that reduced problems are not necessarily highway problems. Indeed, if x i in Definition 3.2 is small enough, then the "highway" may receive a gap, i.e. I N is not an interval; and if x i is large enough, then some "intervals" may have a negative length, i.e., are empty because a j > b j may occur.
Lemma 3.3 For any highway problem (N, I) with |N | > 1 there exist at least two distinct feasible agents.
Proof: Call i ∈ N minimal if for all j ∈ N \ {i} such that I j = I i it holds I j \ I i = ∅. There exists at least one minimal agent i ∈ N , and moreover a minimal agent is of type 0, hence feasible. Now assume that i is the unique minimal agent. Then
Then j is a left agent of type 1 or 0, i.e., the second feasible agent has been found.
q.e.d.
We recall the definition of the Davis-Maschler reduced cost game now. Let (N, c) be a TU cost game (i.e., N is a coalition and c : 2 N → R, c(∅) = 0), x ∈ X * (N, c), and ∅ = S N . The reduced game with respect to (w.r.t.) S and x is the TU game (S, c S,x ) defined by
Lemma 3.4 Let (N, I) ∈ H with |N | 2, i ∈ N be a feasible agent, and x ∈ X(N, I). If λ * I i \ I N \{i} x i λ * (I i ) (i.e., x i is reasonable from below and individually rational for i),
If i is an agent of type 0, then
A careful inspection of (3.1) and (3.2) finishes the proof in this case. If i is a left agent of type 1 and k is the unique agent such that a i < a k b k < b i , then the case k / ∈ T can be treated as before. If k ∈ T , then the cases T 2 = ∅ or (T 1 = ∅ and max{b j | j ∈ T 1 } b i ) are straightforward as well as the case that
In the remaining case,
, again a careful inspection (3.1) and (3.2) completes the proof. Finally, if i is a right agent of type 1, but not a left agent, then we may argue similarly.
We now recall explicitly the definitions by Peleg (1986) of the reduced game property and its converse. A solution σ on a set Γ of TU games satisfies (8') the reduced game property (RGP) if for all (N, c) ∈ Γ, ∅ = S N , and x ∈ σ(N, c): (S, c S,x ) ∈ Γ and x S ∈ σ(S, c S,x ); (9') the converse reduced game property (CRGP) if the following condition is satisfied for (N, c) ∈ Γ with |N | 3, x ∈ X(N, c) = {x ∈ R N | x(N ) = c(N )}: If, for any S ⊆ N with |S| = 2, (S, c S,x ) ∈ Γ and x S ∈ σ(S, c S,x ), then x ∈ σ(N, c).
Unfortunately, in general the reduced game of a highway game even w.r.t. imputations that are reasonable from below may not be highway games (see Example 5.6). However, according to Lemma 3.4, if only feasible agents may successively be removed, then reducing yields highway games. Hence, the following definitions are motivated. A solution σ on H satisfies (8) the reduced highway problem property (RHP) if for any (N, I) ∈ H with |N | > 1, any feasible agent i ∈ N , and any x ∈ σ(N, I): (N \ {i}, I −i,x ) ∈ H and x N \{i} ∈ σ(N \ {i}, I −i,x ); (9) the converse reduced highway problem property (CRHP) if for any (N, I) ∈ H with |N | 3 and any x ∈ X(N, I) the following condition holds: If, for each feasible agent i ∈ N , (N \ {i}, I −i,x ) ∈ H and x N \{i} ∈ σ(N \ {i}, I −i,x ), then x ∈ σ(N, I).
Now, for a solution on H we suitably restate Peleg's notion (see also Sudhölter and Peleg 2002) of "unanimity for two-person games" and present a strong version of CRHP that is similar to a modification of CRGP that has been employed by Serrano and Volij (1998) in an axiomatization of the core and by Sudhölter and Potters (2001) in the axiomatization of the semi-reactive prebargaining set.
The solution σ on H satisfies (10) unanimity of two-person highway problems (UTPH) if, for any (N, I) ∈ H with |N | = 2 : σ(N, I) = x ∈ X(N, I) | x i c I ({i}) for all i ∈ N ;
(11) the strong converse reduced highway problem property (SCRHP) if for any (N, I) ∈ H with |N | 2, and any x ∈ X(N, I) the following condition holds: If, for each feasible agent i ∈ N , (N \ {i}, I −i,x ) ∈ H and x N \{i} ∈ σ(N \ {i}, I −i,x ), then x ∈ σ(N, I).
Characterization of the core of highway problems
Recall that the core of (N, I), denoted C(N, I), is the set
Lemma 4.1 The core on H satisfies NEM, PO, IR, REASB, PCOV, RHP, CRHP, SCRHP, and UTPH.
Proof: NEM follows from the concavity of highway games, PO, IR, REASB, and UTPH are immediate consequences of the definition of the core, and PCOV follows from the well-known scale covariance and translation covariance of the core on any set of games. As the core is reasonable and satisfies RGP on the set of games with nonempty cores (Peleg 1986) , Lemma 3.4 shows RHP.
In order to show CRHP and SCRHP, let (N, I) ∈ H such that |N | 2. Let x ∈ X(N, I) such that (N \ {i}, I −i,x ) ∈ H and x N \{i} ∈ C(N \ {i}, I −i,x ) for each feasible agent i ∈ N . Assume that x / ∈ C(N, I) and let ∅ = S N such that x(S) > c I (S). Two cases may occur: (a) If |N | > 2, by Lemma 3.3 one of the following subcases must occur: (a1) There exists a feasible i ∈ S and |S| 2. In this case 
). In the remaining case, we may assume that
Thus, x ∈ C(N, I) and SCRHP has been verified.
q.e.d. The following alternative characterization of the core resembles Peleg's (1986) one for TU games.
Theorem 4.3
The core is the unique solution that satisfies IR, UTPH, RHP, and CRHP.
Proof: By Lemma 4.1 the core satisfies the required axioms. In order to show uniqueness, let σ be a solution that satisfies IR, UTPH, RHP, and CRHP. Let (N, I) ∈ H. If |N | 2, then by IR, UTPH, and RHP, σ(N, I) = C(N, I). We proceed by induction on |N | and assume that σ(N, I) = C(N, I) whenever |N | < t for some t > 2. Now, if |N | = t, let x ∈ σ(N, I) and y ∈ C(N, I). By RHP of σ and CRHP of C, x ∈ C(N, I). By RHP of C and CRHP of σ, y ∈ σ(N, I).
Remark 4.4
As it is well known the core does not satisfy SIVA nor ETP on the general class of TU games, and the same happens for highway problems.
Characterization of the nucleolus of a highway game
We now recall the definition of the prenucleolus (Schmeidler 1969 ) and the prekernel (Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley 1972) .
Let (N, c) be a cost game, x ∈ R N , S ⊆ N , and i, j ∈ N , i = j. The excess of S at x is e(S, x, c) = x(S) − c(S), and the maximum surplus of i over j at x is s ij (x, c) = max{e(S, x, c) | i ∈ S ⊆ N \ {j}}. With X(N, c) = {x ∈ R N | x(N ) = c(N )}, the prekernel of (N, c), denoted by PK(N, c), is the set
The prenucleolus of (N, c) is the subset of elements of X(N, c) that lexicographically minimize the non-increasingly ordered vector (e(S, x, c)) S⊆N of excesses. According to Schmeidler (1969) , the prenucleolus of (N, c) is a singleton whose unique element is denoted by ν(N, c). For a zero-antitonic game (N, c) 4 -a concave game is zero-antitonic -the prekernel coincides with the kernel (Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley 1972) , i.e., prenucleolus is individually rational, it is the nucleolus.
Remark 5.1 According to Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1972) , the prekernel of a concave cost game consists of a single point, namely of the nucleolus.
We define the nucleolus of a highway problem (N, I) to be the (pre)nucleolus of the associated cost game (N, c I ) and denote ν(N, I) = ν(N, c I ).
The following technical lemma is useful.
Lemma 5.2 For any (N, I) ∈ H that has exactly two distinct feasible agents k and , (I k ∪ I ) ⊆ int I i for all i ∈ N \ {k, }.
Proof:
Note that w.r.t. the highway subproblem N \ {k, }, (I j ) j∈N \{k, } , agent i 1 is a left agent of type 0 and i 2 is a right agent of type 0. Assume that a i 1 a. As i 1 is not feasible, she is not an agent of type 0, i.e., I ⊆ int I i 1 . But then i 1 is a left agent of type 1, i.e., still feasible, which was excluded. Similarly it is seen that b i 2 > b: Assuming that, on the contrary, b i 2 b yields a contradiction because on the on hand side i 2 cannot be of type 0 and on the other hand she cannot be a right agent of type 1.
Lemma 5.3 The nucleolus (on H) satisfies NEM, PO, SIVA, ETP, IR, REASB, PCOV, RHP and CRHP.
Proof: The prenucleolus on cost games satisfies the properties corresponding to SIVA (hence NEM), and ETP so that these properties are also satisfied by the nucleolus of highway problems. Moreover, it satisfies translation covariance which implies PCOV, and, by definition, if satisfies PO. The prenucleolus always selects a core element if the core is nonempty. By Lemma 3.4 the reduced problems w.r.t. feasible agents are highway problems, the associated games of which are Davis-Maschler reduced games. According to Sobolev (1975) the prenucleolus satisfies RGP which implies that our nucleolus satisfies RHP. In order to show CRHP, let (N, I) ∈ H with |N | 3 and let x ∈ X(N, I) such that x N \{i} = ν(N \{i}, I −i,x ) for all feasible agents i ∈ N . Let k, ∈ N, k = . By Remark 5.1 it suffices to show that s k (x, c I ) = s k (x, c I ). If there is a feasible agent i ∈ N \ {k, }, then the game (N \ {i}, c) associated with the reduced highway problem (N \{i}, I −i,x ) is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of (N, c I ) so that
Otherwise, k and are the unique feasible agents and we know that s ij (x, c I ) = s ji (x, c I ) for all {i, j} ⊆ N with i = j except {k, }. As the nucleolus selects a member of the core, x ∈ C(N, I) by CRHP of the core. Let µ = max{e(S, x, c I ) | ∅ = S N } and define D = {S N | S = ∅, e(S, x, c I ) = µ}. It suffices to show that s k (x, c I ) = µ. Assume the contrary. We claim that
. As x k 0 and as I k ⊆ I i by Lemma 5.2, e(S ∪ {k}, x, c I ) µ so that ∈ S by our assumption. If there exists j ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k, }), then µ = s j (x, c I ) = s j (x, c I ) so that there exists S ∈ D with / ∈ S j which cannot be true by the former argument. Hence, S = N \ {k} in this case. If S ∩ N \ {k, } = ∅, then ∈ S because e({k}, x, c I ) < µ. Therefore, for i ∈ N \ {k, }, s i (x, c I ) = µ = s i (x, c I ), and hence there exists S ∈ D with / ∈ S i which is impossible by the former argument. Now the proof can be finished. By our claim, s ik (x, c I ) = µ = s ki (x, c I ) for i ∈ N \ {k, } so that we have derived a contradiction to our claim that N \ {k} is the unique coalition in D.
Theorem 5.4
The nucleolus on H is the unique solution that satisfies SIVA, ETP, PCOV, and RHP provided |U 2.
Proof: By Lemma 5.3 the nucleolus satisfies these properties. In order to show the opposite implication, let σ be a solution that satisfies the desired axioms. Let (N, I) ∈ H and let x be the unique element of σ(N, I). We have to show that x = ν(N, c I ). If |N | = 1, say N = {i}, then by PCOV we may assume that I i = [0, 0]. Choose j ∈ U \ {i}, define I j = I i , and let y = σ({i, j}, I). By ETP, y i = y j . By RHP, y j = 0 because otherwise I −j,y i = ∅. Hence, x = y i = 0. If |N | = 2, then by PCOV we may assume that I i = I j for i, j ∈ N , and, hence, x i = x j by ETP. By RHP, x ∈ X(N, I), hence x = ν(N, I). Now we proceed by induction on |N | and assume that the unique element of σ(N, I) coincides with ν(N, I) whenever |N | < r for some r > 2. If |N | = r, then by RHP, x N \{i} = ν(N \ {i}, c I i,x ) for each feasible agent so that, by CRHP of ν, x = ν(N, I).
Remark 5.5 (1) A careful inspection of its proof shows that the axiom SIVA in Theorem 5.4 may be replaced by NEM and PO.
(2) The nucleolus does neither satisfy UTPH nor SCRHP.
By means of the following examples we show that a reduced game w.r.t. the nucleolus of a highway game may not result in a highway game if (1) a non-oriented agent of type 1 is removed or if (2) an oriented agent of type 2 is removed (provided |U | 4). This is the reason for the present definition of RHP, where only agents of type 0 or oriented agents of type 1 may be removed. We now show that (N , c) is not strategically equivalent to a highway game. Assume the contrary.
As each positive multiple of a highway game is a highway game, there exist (N , I ) ∈ H and y ∈ R N such that c + y = c I . Let I i = [a i , b i ] for i ∈ N , choose j, k, ∈ N such that a j = min i∈N a i , and choose k ∈ N \ {j} such that b k = max i∈N \{j} b i , and N = {j, k, }. As c({j}) = 2, b j = a j + 2 + y j . As a i a j and c({j, i}) = 3 for i ∈ N \ {k}, b i = a j + 3 + y j + y i . Moreover, as c({i}) = 2, a i = a j + 1 + y j . Finally, as c({k, }) = 3, a k = a , and b k b ,
so that y = −1, i.e., c I (N ) = c I (N \ { }) − 1, and the desired contradiction has been obtained. Note that agent 4 is of type 1, but not oriented.
(2) Now we consider (N, 
The Shapley value of highway problems
In order to recall the definition of the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) of a TU game (N, c), recall that for any ∅ = S ⊆ N , the dual unanimity game (N, u * S ) is defined by
vector space basis of the Euclidean space of all TU games with player set N , i.e., of R 2 N \{∅} . Hence, there are unique real coefficients λ S , ∅ = S ⊆ N , such that c = ∅ =S⊆N λ S u * S . Now, the Shapley value of (N, c) is the vector
so that φ is additive.
The Shapley value of a highway problem (N, I) ∈ H, denoted by φ(N, I), is the Shapley value of the associated game (N, c I ). By slightly abusing notation, for a single-valued solution σ on H the unique element of the singleton σ(N, I) is also denoted by σ(N, I) and, conversely, we use φ(N, I) for {φ(N, v)} so that φ becomes a solution. In order to obtain an explicit formula for φ(N, I), let T I : N → M I (see (2.1) for the definition of M I ) be the function that assigns to each agent the set of section she uses, i.e., T I (i) = {j ∈ M | j ⊆ I i } for all i ∈ N , and denote
so that, by (6.1),
] for all i ∈ N , and b = max i∈N b i . In order to resemble Young's (1985a) characterization of φ with the help of strong monotonicity, some preparation is useful.
Hence, (N, I [α,β] ) is the highway problem that arises from (N, I) if the highway is restricted to the interval [α, β] . We say that a single-valued solution σ (on H ⊆ H) satisfies (12) individual independence of outside changes (IIOC) if for all (N, I), (N, I ) ∈ H and all i ∈ N : If
IIOC means that the charge of an agent i may only depend on the highway problem truncated to her used interval. Note that strong monotonicity of a single-valued solution σ on the set of games requires that, for (N, c),
). By (6.2), strong monotonicity of σ implies IIOC of the corresponding solution on H.
Theorem 6.1 The Shapley value on H is the only solution that satisfies SIVA, PO, ETP, and IIOC.
Proof: The Shapley value satisfies the four axioms by (6.2). In order to prove the other implication, let σ be a solution that satisfies SIVA, PO, ETP, and IIOC. Let (N, I) ∈ H and b = max I N . By induction on M I we prove that σ(N, I) = φ(N, I). If M I = 1, then I i = I j for every i, j ∈ N , and the result follows from SIVA, PO, and ETP. Assume that σ(N, I) = φ(N, I) whenever M I < k for some k 2. If M I = k, let α, β be determined by α = b, β = 0, and
Note that, for any i ∈ N \ (P ∪ Q), I i = I N . Hence, by SIVA, PO, and ETP it suffices to show that σ P ∪Q (N, I) = φ P ∪Q (N, I). With I = I [β,b] we have M I < k and I i = I i for all i ∈ P , and with I = I [0,α] we have M I < k and I j = I j for all j ∈ Q so that the inductive hypothesis finishes the proof.
The Shapley value of airport problems
A highway problem (N, I) ∈ H, I i = [a i , b i ] for i ∈ N , is an airport problem if a i = 0 for all i ∈ N . Let A denote the set of airport problems. Let (N, I) ∈ A and let N = {i 1 , . . . , i n } so that b i 1 · · · b in . By (6.2), the Shapley value can be recursively computed as
Let |N | 2, i ∈ N and x ∈ R N . The contracted problem w.r.t. i and x, denoted (N \ {i}, I −i,x,ctr ), is defined as follows. For j ∈ N \ {i}, I
The contracted problem can be interpreted as a kind of reduced problem in the following way. Assume that a payoff vector, say x is at stake, and everybody accepts the payoff assigned to a certain agent, say i. That is, agent i pays x i and the remaining agents renegotiate in a new airport problem, the contracted problem, in which the cost of the runway that is used by every agent j ∈ N \ {i} has to be updated taking into account the payoff made by i. In the contracted problem, we are assuming that the cost of the runway used by agent j = i is decreased by x i , unless this discount were higher than x j , in which case the discount would be x j .
Note that (N, I −i,x,ctr ) ∈ A if and only if b j − min{x j , x i } 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
We say that a solution σ on A satisfies the (13') contraction property (CONTR) if it is consistent w.r.t. contracted problems, i.e., if, for all (N, I) ∈ A with |N | > 1, all x ∈ σ(N, I), and all i ∈ N : (N \ {i}, I −i,x,ctr ) ∈ A and x N \{i} ∈ σ(N, I −i,x,ctr ).
Theorem 6.2 On A the Shapley value is the unique solution that satisfies NEM, PO, and CONTR.
Proof: By definition the Shapley value is a singleton, hence satisfies NEM. By (6.3) it satisfies PO and CONTR as well. In order to show the uniqueness part, let σ be a solution on A that satisfies NEM, PO, and CONTR. Let (N, I) ∈ A, I j = [a j , b j ] for j ∈ N , and x ∈ σ(N, I). By NEM it suffices to show that x = φ(N, I). We proceed by induction on |N |. If |N | = 1, then x = φ(N, I) by NEM and PO. Now assume that x = φ(N, I) whenever |N | < k for some k 2.
Claim: x j x in for all j ∈ N . Indeed, assume on the contrary that there exists j ∈ N such
so that x N \{j} is not feasible for the reduced airport problem (N \ {j}, I −j,x,ctr ). Now let I = I −in,x,ctr , I = [a , b ] for ∈ N \ {i}. By our claim, b j = b j − x j . By the inductive hypothesis, x N \{in} = φ(N \ {i n }, I ) so that we conclude from (6.3) that x i x j if and only if
so that
We proceed recursively and assume that x i j = φ i j (N, I) for j = 1, . . . , t. If t < n − 1, then, by (6.3), (N, I) . Finally, by PO, x in = φ in (N, I) . q.e.d
We now generalize CONTR to highway problems.
The contraction property on highway games
Let (N, I) ∈ H, I j = [a j , b j ] for all j ∈ N , and assume |N | 2. Now assume that |N | 2. For any left agent i ∈ N of type 0 (i.e., a j > a i implies a j b i ) and any y ∈ R N we define the contracted problem w.r.t. i and y, (N \ {i}, I −i,y,ctr ), for any j ∈ N \ {i}, by I
Note that a contracted problem may not be a highway problem.
We say that a solution σ on H satisfies the Hence, CONTR requires that σ is consistent w.r.t. any contraction of a highway problem according to the solution applied to the truncated highway problem the highway of which starts at the interval used by a left agent of type 0.
In an airport problem each agent i is a left agent of type 0 and a i = 0 so that the current CONTR coincides with the former CONTR on A -the only further requirement that must be satisfied on H is that consistency must be satisfied w.r.t. contracted highway problems defined with the help of any element of the solution applied to the truncated highway problem. Of course we may also use this slightly stronger contraction property in Theorem 6.2.
It should be noted that this kind of "reduction" that depends on the solution applied to certain derived problems (here certain truncated highways) is not new for axiomatizations of the Shapley value -Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) also define their consistency property only for solutions that satisfy SIVA so that their "reduced game" is defined with the help of the solution applied to subgames. Note, however, that the TU game corresponding to a contracted highway problem w.r.t. the Shapley value does typically not coincide with the corresponding Hart-Mas-Colell "reduced game" of the initial highway game (which may be illustrated by any 4-person airport problem with equal positive demands).
Of course, we may also reverse the start and the endpoints of the landing strip of the airport and call a highway problem (N, I) and airport problem if b i = b j for all i, j ∈ N . This would lead to a contraction property requiring that the solution is consistent according to a certain kind of contraction w.r.t. any right agent of type 0. q.e.d.
Note that the empty solution satisfies PO and CONTR, but violates NEM, and that the nucleolus satisfies NEM and PO, but violates CONTR provided that |U | 3. The solution σ that differs from the Shapley value only in as much as σ {i}, I = φ({i}, I), φ({i}, I) + 1 for one-person highway problems ({i}, I) satisfies NEM and CONTR, but violates PO. Hence, each of the axioms employed in Theorem 6.2 as well as in Theorem 6.3 is logically independent of the remaining axioms.
Generalized highway problems
The definition of a generalized highway problem (N, I) differs from Definition 2.1 only inasmuch as (2) is weakened to "I is a mapping that assigns to each i ∈ N a finite union of compact nonempty intervals in R + ." Hence, in a generalized highway problem the customers may use disconnected sections of the highway. The associated TU cost game (N, c I ) is still defined by (2.2). For a generalized highway problem it is convenient to use the representation of Kuipers, Mosquera, and Zarzuelo (2013) : A tuple (N, M, C, T ) is a generalized highway problem if it satisfies (2.3), (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7) of Remark 2.2 so that the cost function c M,C,T is defined by (2.8). In particular we do not need a strict ordering ≺ of M . Hence, we denote by GH the set of generalized highway games (N, M, C, T ).
Let (N, M, C, T ) ∈ GH. We now show that (N, c M,C,T ) is a positive game. A game (N, c) is called positive if c = ∅ =S⊆N λ S u * S , where the unique coefficients λ S , ∅ = S ⊆ N, are nonnegative. For each section j ∈ M let T −1 (j) = {i ∈ N | j ∈ T (i)}, i.e., the set of users of j. Therefore, we have c M,C,T = j∈M C(j)u * T −1 (j) . (7.4)
As C(j) 0 for all j ∈ M , (N, c M,C,T ) is a positive game. The following theorem shows that the converse is also true.
Theorem 7.1 A TU cost game is a positive game if and only if it is a highway game.
Proof: By (7.4) we only have to show the only-if part. Let N be a coalition, λ S 0 for all ∅ = S ⊆ N , and let c = ∅ =S⊆N λ S u * S . We define the direct generalized highway problem (N, M, C, T ) (corresponding to (N, c)) by M = 2 N \ {∅}, T (i) = {S ∈ M | i ∈ S} for all i ∈ N, and C(S) = λ S for all S ∈ M.
Then T −1 (S) = S and, by (7.4), C M,C,T = c. q.e.d. 
Discussion
The first part of Theorem 5.5 of Potters and Sudhölter (1999) provides a characterization of the nucleolus on airport problems that employs properties similar to those that occur in our Theorem 5.4. However, our properties are defined without mentioning the games associated with the corresponding cost sharing problems (here highway problems) whereas in the mentioned
